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LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE PILGRIMS
By Julian P. Nordlund, of the Dqnver Bar
(A paper presented to the Law Club)

AMILIAR is the general narrative of the Pilgrims.
From schoolboy days we have known about the bitter
persecutions which drove that group of Separatists from
the hostile bounds of England, the brief sojourn which they
enjoyed upon the hospitable shores of Holland, the causes
which led them to seek an unsettled, distant land. We have
thrilled again and again to the story of the obstacles which
beset the embarkation of that intrepid band, of the perils of
their voyage across the stormy waters of the Atlantic, of the
famine, sufferings and privations of their wilderness life.
Gripping though that story is, equally fascinating and inspiring, but little known and less appreciated, is another phase of
their eventful lives: the system of law and order which they
evolved. Simple and crude that system was, but in it we find
the very foundation stones of republican institutions on this
continent. Too deserving it is for a treatment so imperfect
and sketchy as this will be.
In 1620 when the Mayflower set sail for this continent,
English colonies had already been planted in Virginia. A
charter had been granted by the Crown to the Virginia ComAuthor's Note: The value, if any, of a historical sketch, as this aspires to be,
depends to a large extent, of course, upon the sources from which it is drawn. The
material for this has been gathered principally from the following works: Bradford's
History of Plymouth Plantation; Mourt's Relation; Plymouth Town Records; Ancient
Landmarks of Plymouth, Hon. Win. T. Davis; Bancroft's History of United States;
Goodwin's, Pilgrim Republic. Historical Memoir of New Plymouth, Hon. F. Baylies;
Martyn's Pilgrim Fathers of New England. The first three are primary sources; the
remaining ones, while secondary authorities, are believed to rank high in accuracy
and trustworthiness. One original authority, Plymouth Colony Records and Laws, has
unfortunately not been accessible. Perhaps, without it, no attempt as this is warranted;
with it many details, wanting herein, could no doubt have been supplied and numerous
questions occurring to the reader, could have been answered. Citation of authorities
for most of the historical facts stated has seemed impracticable, and some quotations
occur without accrediting the authority quoted.
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pany, which was comprised of two divisions or companiesthe one, the London, or southern company, had been granted
authority to locate between the 34th and 41st degrees, or between Cape Fear and Long Island Sound, and the second, or
northern, or Plymouth, company, had a grant to the territory
northward to the 45th degree. The Pilgrims set sail with a
patent from the southern Virginia company, but for some reason upon which historians do not fully agree, the Mayflower
found itself in early November in the harbor of Cape Cod.
This was far north of the limits of their grant; but as the passage to the south was rough and dangerous, and the season was
already late, that little shipload of 102 decided on landing
where they were. This decision was more momentous than it
might at first appear, because if they landed there at Plymouth, beyond the limits of the Southern Virginia Company,
they would lose such right as they might claim under the patent which they had and would be outside of all established
authority. But the leaders were equal to the emergency and if
there was no established government for them they would
make one.
The situation which was thus presented and how it was
met, is best told in the words of William Bradford as written
in his "'Historyof Plymouth Plantation". (Bradford was one
of the original company and for years governor of the colony;
the history which he penned covers the period from 1606 to
1646. The manuscript was long lost and has, in itself, a dramatic history). He writes:
"I shall a litle returne backe and begine with a combination made by
them before they came ashore, being ye first foundation of their governmente
in this place; occasioned partly by ye discontented & mutinous speeches that
some of the strangers amongst them had let fall from them in ye ship--That
when they came a shore they would use their owne libertie; for none had
power to command them, the patente they had being for Virginia, and not for
New-england, which belonged to an other Government, with which ye Virginia Company had nothing to doe. And partly that shuch an acte by them
done (this their condition considered) might be as firme as any patent, and in
some respects more sure."

The "combination" was signed in the cabin of the Mayflower by all adult males cf the party. Bradford says "the
forme was as followeth":
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"In ye name of God, Amen. We whose names are underwriten, the
loyall subjects of our dread soveraigne Lord, King James, by ye grace of God,
of.Great Britaine, Franc, & Ireland king, defender of ye faith, &c., haveing
undertaken, for ye glorie of God, and advancements of ye Christian faith, and
honour of our king & countrie, a voyage to plant ye first colonie in ye Northerne parts of Virginia, doe by these presents solemnly & mutualy in ye presence of God, and one of another, covenant & combine our selves togeather into
a civill body politick, for our better ordering & preservation & furtherance of
ye ends aforesaid; and by vertue hearof to enacte, constitute, and frame such
just & equall lawes, ordinances, acts, constitutions, & offices, from time to time,
as shall be though most meete and convenient for ye generall good of ye Colonie, unto which we promise all due submission and obedience. In witness
whereof we have hereunder subscribed our names at Cap-Codd ye 11. of November, in ye year of ye raigne of our soveraigne lord, King James, of England, France, & Ireland ye eighteenth, and of Scotland ye fiftie fourth. Ano:
Dom. 1620."

Viewed in the setting in which it was conceived and
against the background of the institutions of government which
civilization had to that hour evolved, this compact takes on
the hue of one of the most remarkable documents of all history. Bancroft can scarcely be charged with overstating the
case when he said of it, in his History of the United States:
"This was the birth of popular constitutional liberty. The middle age
had been familiar with charters and constitutions, but they had been merely
compacts for immunities, partial enfranchisements, patents of nobility, concessions of municipal privileges, or limitations of the sovereign power in favor
of feudal institutions. In the cabin of the Mayflower, humanity recovered its
rights, and instituted government on the basis of equal laws for the general
good."

And, of this compact, John Quincy Adams remarked, in
1802:
"This is perhaps the only instance in human history of that positive,
original social compact which speculative philosophers have imagined as the
only legitimate source of government. Here was a unanimous and personal
assent by all the individuals of the community to the association, by which
they became a nation. * * * The settlers of all the former European colonies
had contented themselves with the powers conferred upon them by their respective charters, without looking beyond the seal of the royal parchment for
the measure of their rights and the rule of their duties. The founders of Plymouth had been impelled by the peculiarities of their situation to examine the
subject with deeper and more comprehensive research."

Goodwin in his "'PilgrimRepublic" makes this observation:
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"They indeed recognized James I as their sovereign, but he ignored them.
The moment they landed north of 410 north latitude, they would become
waifs and estrays, save that they would still be a voluntary church. * * . If
the world would not provide them with a civil organization, they would
present the world with a new system, of a simplicity and excellence hitherto
unknown. Not that they fully comprehended the logic of their own ideas,
but that in this unforeseen emergency they instinctively laid hold on great principles hitherto unrevealed to the nations of the earth."

Thus, here, at New Plymouth, struggling against the almost overwhelming odds of a wilderness, the Pilgrim fathers,
without the sanction of royal charter and without a direct
precedent to follow, began the exercise of self-rule and from
the germ of practical expediency, slowly evolved a system of
government, simple but essentially new and unique. This
system for a while, with its common property and personal
rights, seems almost an experiment in communism but, as the
colony grew, it gradually developed, taking on new form "to
provide remedies for defects, measures for the removal of obstacles, new laws for new needs and new officers for new labors
and duties".
Before the first year had passed, a patent from the Northern Virginia Company was brought over. This conferred
upon the colonists the power to make laws and choose officers
by "most voices" and after its arrival, the compact signed in
the cabin of the Mayflower probably lost its original significance as the source of authority, but the colony continued to
exist and function as a body politic until 1692, when with
Massachusetts Bay and other colonies, it became a part of the
Royal Province of Massachusetts. During this period, the
Plymouth Colony and its neighbor the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, which was planted in 1629, lived under institutions
of government which were in some respects similar, but the
two colonies were wholly separate and distinct, and are not to
be confused.
After recounting the adoption of the compact, Bradford
goes on to say that on the same day "they chose, or rather confirmed, Mr. John Carver their Governour for that year".
Thus we find the colony beginning to function under the direction of a governor chosen by the will of the people. In April,
1621, Carver died and William Bradford was chosen, in his
place. The governor at first was, apparently, the only official,
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but Bradford was given one assistant and in 1624 four more
assistants were added; later, in 1636, the number was increased
to seven. Just how these first elections were held is not entirely clear, but in 1636 a law was passed (what the law-making body was will be indicated later), which probably gave
form to what had been a previous practice and which provided that the election of officers, including the governor, his
assistants and others that will be mentioned later, should be
at a General Court. This General Court was comprised of
the whole body of freemen. Freemen, in turn, were, at first,
the signers of the compact and such other persons as might be
added by a majority vote. Other qualifications for freemen
were from time to time prescribed, one of which barred Quakers and such as were judged by the Court "to be grossly scandalous". Finally in 1671, it was required that freemen be
twenty-one years of age, of sober and peaceable conversation,
orthodox in religion and possessed of twenty pounds ratable
estate in the colony. A curious provision which may here be
noted is that included in the Act of 1636 imposing a fine of
three shillings upon a freeman for failure to appear at an election. It appears that difficulty was experienced even then in
getting the voters to exercise their right of franchise. Another
interesting provision is that which was later made for voting
by proxy. Thus, from the very beginning, the authorities directing the affairs of the colony were elected by popular vote,
and, until the colony's independent existence ended, the freemen met annually in one assembly as a "court of election" and
chose the governor, assistants and other officers.
Originally the body of freeman, or the General Court, as
it was called, was also the law-making body. In 1639, however, an important change was effected in the government.
Several settlements and towns had by this time grown up and
become incorporated into separate units, and it was found inconvenient for the whole body of freemen to attend the General Court at Plymouth. Moreover, the General Court ol
freemen had grown in such numbers as to become unwieldy
So by an enactment in 1639 the General Court was made court of delegates chosen by the freemen in the various town!
in the colony. This law seems of sufficient interest to be he'
set forth in substance:
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"Whereas complaint was made that the freemen were put to many inconveniences and great expense by their continual attendance at the Courts,

it is therefore enacted by the Court for the ease of the several colonies * * *
that every towne shall make choyce of two of their freemen and the town of
Plymouth of four, to be committees or deputies to joyne with the Bench to
enact and make all such laws and ordnances as the common good requires.
* * * Provided that the laws they do enacte shall be ppounded one Court to
be considered up until the next Court and then to be confirmed if they shall be
approved (except the case require present confirmacion). And if any act shall
be confirmed by the Bench and committee which upon further deliberation
shall prove prejudicial * * * the freemen at the next election Court, after
meeting together, may repeal the same and enacte any other useful for the
whole. * * * But if any such committee shall be insufficient or troublesome
that then the Bench and other committees may dismiss them, the town to choose
other freemen in their place."

Most interesting is the provision for expelling undesirable representatives. And apparently even in those days there
was the evil of fickle, ill-considered legislation. One is led to
wonder whether our problem of ever-growing laws and codes
could not be partly solved by following the example of those
humble pioneers and requiring that a bill lie over from one
legislature to the next before it goes upon the books as an enactment.
Incidentally, the governor and his assistants, also known
as magistrates, were called the "Bench", and as provided in
the act just quoted, the representatives from the towns were
called "Committees" or "Deputies". The two branches sat as
one body with the governor presiding. Decisions in the General Court were by a majority vote, with no division between
the Bench and the Deputies. It will also be observed that
while by the law just quoted the newly created court of delegates, acting with the governor and his assistants, became the
law-making body, the freemen as a whole still retained control
over legislation as at the next election Court after the passage
of an Act, it might be repealed and a new act adopted.
Passing now to the judiciary of the colonial organization,
we also find a simple but interesting system. In the early years
of the colony the General Court, then consisting of the whole
body of freemen, in addition to electing officers and passing
laws, constituted the judiciary. Verdicts in cases coming before it were rendered by a majority vote and for some time this
General Court apparently acted as both judge and jury, the
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governor having little authority beyond carrying out the decision. As early as 1623, however, it was enacted that "all
criminal facts and also all matters of trespasses and debts between man and man should be tried by the verdict of twelve
honest men to be impanelled by authority, in form of a jury,
upon their oath". Thus, here, for the first time upon this continent, was that distinctive badge of Saxon civilization, the
right to trial by jury, established. In 1636 it was enacted that
the governor and two assistants might try civil cases involving
an amount not exceeding forty shillings and criminal cases involving a small fine. In that same year what corresponds to
our Grand Jury was provided for by an act reading:
"That a great quest be panelled by the governor and assistants and
warned to serve the King by enquiring into the abuses and breaches of such
wholesome laws and ordinances as tend to the preservation of peace and good.
And that they present such to the Court as they either find guilty or probably
suspect that so they may be prosecuted by the governor by all due meanes."

These provisions relating to trial continued in force until
1665 when provision was made for each town to choose from
its freemen three or five persons called "selectmen" for the
management of the town. These selectmen, or the majority of
them, were empowered to hear and determine "all debts and
differences arising between person and person" within their
respective townships not exceeding forty shillings. If the determination of the selectmen was not "satisfied party wronged
to repair to some magistrate for a warrant to recover such
award by distraint". The selectmen were allowed twelve
pence apiece for everyaward they agreed on. To some of the
towns the right to try certain other small cases seems to have
been given. In 1685 when the colony as a body politic was
already beginning to disappear, courts in the nature of county
courts were organized and the judicial powers of the General
Court and the courts of assistants and selectmen ceased for the
most part and became vested in county judges.
It should be observed at this point that as the towns were
established and incorporated they conducted their internal
affairs at the well known Town Meeting. The Town Meeting
continued even after the establishment of selectmen, and the
records of some of the towns exhibit numerous instances of the
town meeting directing the action of its selectmen and also
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instructing its deputies who represented them in the General
Court. The number of towns grew until when the colonial
government ceased to function there were seventeen 'towns.
But throughout, the colony of New Plymouth as a whole had
its central government at the town of Plymouth, and functioned through its General Court and the magistrates, with the
governor over all.
Further light upon the judicial system is to be found in
the provisions of the act of 1636 when for the first time the
duties of the governor and his assistants were defined by law.
The act relating to the powers of the governor provided,
among other things, that if the assistants judged the case too
great to be decided by them and referred it to the General
Court, then the governor should "summon a Court by warning
all the freemen aforesaid that are then extant and there also
propound causes and goe before the assistants in the examination of particulars and propound such sentence as shall be determined"; further it was made "lawful for him to arrest and
to commit toward any offenders provided that with all convenient speed he should bringe the cause to hearing either of
the assistant or General Court according to the nature of the
offense". The same law of 1636 provided that the office of
assistant consisted, among other things, "in haveing a special
hand in the examination of public offenders" and in "contriving" the affairs of the colony, and "to have a voice in the censuring of such offenders as shall not be brought to public
court". Also it was made lawful for him, in his Majesty's
name, to direct his warrants to any constable within the government and to "bind over persons for matters of crime to
answer at the next ensuing court of His Majesty after the fact
committed, or the person apprehended".
While on the topic of governors and assistants, these further provisions of the Act of 1636, defining the powers of the
governor are noteworthy:
"The office of the Governor for the time being consists in the execution
of such laws and ordnances, as are or shall be made and established for the good
of the corporation according to the several bounds & limits thereof, viz: In
calling together or advising with the Assistants or Counsell of the said corporation upon such material occasions * * * as time shall bring forth. In
which assembly and all others the Governor to propound the occasion of the
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assembly & have a double voice therein. * * 0 And this office continue one
whole year & no more without renewing by election."

The following oath was required of the Governor:
"You shall sweare to be truly loyall to our Sovereign Lord King.
Also according to that measure of wisdome, understanding and discerning
given unto you faithfully, equally and indifferently without respect of psons
to administer justice in all cases coming before you as Governor of New Plymouth. You shall in like manner faithfully duly and truly execute the laws
and ordnances of the same. And shall labor to advance and further the good
of the Colonies and plantacons within the limits thereof to the utmost of your
power and oppose anything that shall seem to hinder the same."

Another interesting provision and one which would be
most unnecessary in these days, made the offices of governor
and assistant obligatory and a fine of twenty pounds was provided for a refusal of any one to "hold and execute the office
of governor for his year", and of ten pounds for the refusal to
act as assistant.
As early as 1633 constables were also found necessary.
Up to that time Miles Standish, as captain of the guard, had
apparently performed the duties belonging to the office of
constable. This office was also elective, there being one constable for each of certain divisions or wards. The constable
was required to take an oath to diligently see that His Majesty's peace be not broken and to carry the person offending
before the governor or some one of his assistants and there
attend the hearing of the case and such order as shall-be given
and to apprehend all suspicious persons and bring them before
the governor or some one of his assistants. The constable was
also delegated to give notice to the freemen of meetings of the
General Court.
In addition to the offices of governor, assistants and constable, provision was made from time to time for the annual
election of other officers, including a deputy governor, treasurer, secretary, coroner, assessor of rates, and in 1634 persons
were also chosen whose duties were to lay out highways.
A survey of this phase of the Pilgrim period would not
be complete without a brief separate consideration of its laws.
It is recorded in Bradford's History that early in 1621
"they mette and consulted of laws and orders both for their
civill and military governments as the necessities of their con-
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dition did require * * ", and the Colony records exhibit several laws passed during the early years to meet special wants.
Not until 1636, however, was any written code of laws drafted.
In 1658 a second revision was made, a copy being written for
each town and this copy was to be publicly read in each town
once a year. In.1671 a further revision was made and for the
first time the laws were printed. In 1685 the last revision was
made. Goodwin, in his Pilgrim Republic, observes that "truly
it was a wonderful community that, by mass meetings of its
citizens, could so long and so successfully conduct such weighty affairs, with no more formally defined frame of government, or assignment or limitation of official powers, and with
no written laws against crime".
In enacting their laws, the General Court was no doubt
influenced and guided by English laws and customs, but they
made many new enactments to fit their own peculiar needs and
many which were wholly repugnant to English law. Likewise in a good many cases coming before them, the magistrates
probably followed the usage of England, especially in criminal matters and where they had no applicable law of their
own, but it is certain that they did not consider the laws of
England binding upon them. In the early years, at least, the
scriptures appear to have had more weight as precedents than
did the laws of England, and such ponderous questions as
"'What sodomitical acts are to be punished with death" were
referred to the Elders for advice. About in 1684 one town
made recommendations to the Committee on Revision of Laws
for an enactment "that in all civil cases if either party produces a known law of England in defense of his case it may
be made publicly to appear that it is the law allowed of in
this government as the rule of justice in all known cases".
There seems, however, to be no record of such enactment ever
being made.
Some of the early laws not already mentioned are: In
1626 exportation of food and lumber without official permit
was forbidden. In 1633 it was made finable to permit drunkenness in one's house and strong drinks were to be retailed
only by innkeepers who were to sell not over 2d worth to anyone but strangers just arrived. Wills were to be probated
within one month before the Governor and his Council-so it
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appears this body was also the probate court. A widow was
to have one-third of the real estate for life and one-third the
personalty absolutely.
In 1636 horse racing was forbidden and so also walking
about late of nights. Sabbath work and travelling was forbidden and also visiting on that day. Profane swearing was
punishable by placing in the stocks; lying, by the stocks or by
fine. No person was to be admitted to live in the colony without the leave of the governor or two of his assistants. Some of
the new laws enacted after 1636 included laws sharply restrictive as to spirituous drinks and strong measures were taken to
keep everything of the sort from the Indians. Frequent
falsity of Indian evidences as to where they got their drink
led in 1673 to the establishment for such cases of the new principle of allowing the accused to testify for himself at his option. In 1682 this was extended to suits for the collection of
accounts. In 1638 smoking of tobacco was forbidden on the
highway or out of doors within a mile of a dwelling house or
while at work in the fields. That same year the Court attempted to regulate wages but after a few months withdrew
the order. Quaker troubles beginning in about 1659 were
probably the cause of many sharp laws bearing on religious
conduct. In 1662 the Court charges each town to have a
school master set up and fifteen years later this was made compulsory on all places of fifty families.
Marriage ceremonies were performed only by the magistrates, because, Bradford writes, "it being a civil thing upon
which many questions about inheritances do depend * * * and
most consonant to the scriptures-Ruth 4, and nowhere found
in the gospels to be layed on the ministers as a part of their
office".
Another of the earlier enactments must be briefly mentioned because in its startling pronouncement one finds a forerunner of the declaration of American independence which
the following century was to bring forth: It reads:
"As freeborn subjects of the State of England, we hither come indewed
with all and singular the privileges belonging to such * * * that according to
the due privilege aforesaid no imposion, law or ordnance be made or imposed
upon us by ourselves or others at present or to come but such as shall be made
or imposed by consent according to the free liberties of the state & King of
England."
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Fascinating, also, is that part of the colony's legal history
relating to the cases, civil and criminal, which came before
its tribunals, but space permits only brief mention of this
phase.
In an inexorable manner and with almost barbaric severity and with utter disregard for personages, justice was administered and punishment meted out. The lash was a common punishment for minor offenders. Heavy fines were imposed for lying, swearing, card playing and drunkenness.
Many offenders were put in the stocks or compelled to lie in
a public place, heels tied to neck. There were ten executions
under the civil authority in the colony. There were six divorces granted during the colony's existence. So far as I could
find, the Colony had no divorce law and what, if any, grounds
except scriptural, existed, I cannot say.
Cruel and almost barbarous as was often its means for
dealing with infractions of its strict code, the Plymouth colony's actions as to witchcraft is refreshing. It was not caught
in the frenzy of this superstition as were the neighboring colonies and while Plymouth had a law for the execution of
witches only two cases arose in the colony and in both the accused went free.
The Pilgrim General Court exhibited a zeal which would
tax us sorely. It met at 7 A.M. in summer and at 8 A.M. in
winter, and there was a fine of 6d for tardiness.
In 1630 Bradford writes of a murder case:
"This year John Billington ye elder (one that came over with the first)
was arrained and both by grand and petit jurie found guilty of willful murder, by plane and notorious evidence and was for ye same accordingly executed.
This was ye first execution amongst them so it was a matter of great sadness
unto them. They used all due means about his trial and took ye advice of
Mr. Winthrop and other ye ablest gentlemen in ye Bay of Massachusetts,
that were then nL ily come over, who concurred with them yt he ought to
dye and ye land to be purged from blood."

Many novel punishments were ordered. In 1625 one
Oldam who had been a troublesome character and ordered out
of the colony, returned without leave, and, writes Bradford:
"But in conclusion they comited him till he was tamer and then appointed a guard of musketeers which he was to pass throw and everyone was
ordered to give him a thump on ye brich with the but end of his musket."
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Bradford relates of another incident of which he says,
"Horrible it is to mention but ye truth of ye history requires
it". And so also, truth of this account requires me to make
brief mention of it too, because it serves to illustrate not only
their procedure but also their reliance on scriptural law. A
youth of about 17 had been detected of and had confessed to
buggery with a mare, a cow, two goats, five sheep, two calves
and a turkey. Bradford writes:
"And this free confession was not only in private to ye magistrates but
afterwards, upon his indictment, to ye whole court and jury. * * * And whereas some of ye sheep could not so well be knowne by his description of them,
others with them were brought before him and he declared which were they
and which were not. And accordingly he was cast by ye jury and condemned
and afterwards executed about ye 8 of Sept. 1642. A very sad spectacle, it
was, for first the mare and then ye cowes and ye rest of ye lesser cattle were
kild before his face according to ye law. Levit. 20-15. And then he himself
was executed."

The events which led to the sounding of the death knell
of this colonial government of the people are beyond the scope
of this narrative. As early as 1686, however, the end was to
be seen, and in 1692 Governor Phipps arrived from England
with a charter which combined Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay
and other colonies, into the royal province of Massachusetts.
The body-politic created in the cabin of the Mayflower had
passed into history. But was not the future to demonstrate
that they had builded better than they knew, and that the
simple edifices which they left behind were to tower into institutions beyond the imagination of men?

REVISING REDEMPTIONS
By Ira L. Quiat, of the Denver Bar
HERE is pending in the present General Assembly a
Bill relating to redemptions. The object of this Article
is to explain briefly the defects in our existing statutes
sought to be remedied and the provisions of the proposed law.
An expression of opinion is requested from the Bench and Bar,
so that a workable, just and constructive piece of legislation
may be enacted. Comments addressed to Dicta or the writer
will be appreciated.
There are two redemption statutes in this state. The one
in relation to trust deeds is covered in Sections 5053-5057 of
the Compiled Laws of 1921. Redemption from execution
sales (including mortgages) is found at Sections 5950-5956.
The statutory period allotted in both cases to the grantor,
owner, defendant, subsequent encumbrancer and assigns is six
months. Under neither system is there any preference granted
to successive encumbrances. Judgment creditors are granted
an additional period of three months. Seniority of judgment
creditors is not provided for in the statutory redemption of
trust deed foreclosures. In the redemption from execution
sales there is an attempt to create some system of preference;
the senior judgment is granted a priority during the first two
days and other creditors also have a preference to redeem during a like successive period in the order of the seniority of
their judgments. But how is the rank determined? It has
been held that a judgment creditor need not record his lien
to be entitled to redeem. A search through judgment records
of all courts would be the only way of determining the priority. In practice therefore these preferences are meaningless.
The Supreme Court in Stryker vs. Dunn, 72 Colo. 45, has
pointed out some glaring defects in the statutory provisions
concerning the redemption from a foreclosure of a trust deed.
That case lays down the rule as to subsequent encumbrancers,
although the question of subrogation was not decided. If a
first trust deed is foreclosed and no redemption follows, it is
elementary that the owners and all subsequent encumbrancers
are barred. However, if there are three trust deeds and the
holder of the second takes no action upon foreclosure of the
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first, the holder of the third redeems at his peril, for then the
second trust deed is not cut out. The second encumbrancer
acquires an advantage through the act of the holder of the
third trust deed, which he otherwise would not have.
The decision in the Stryker case could not be otherwise
under our statute, yet it seems unfair and the opposite prevails
in nearly all other states. Of course each person should be
given an opportunity to protect his lien, but a definite period
should be fixed for each lienor, and if he fails to redeem within the allotted time, his lien should be lost.
Many mooted questions founded on imaginary situations
arising from redemptions by some subsequent encumbrancers
and judgment creditors and a failure so to do by others, have
been debated by lawyers since the Stryker decision. But
neither time nor space permits such theoretical discussion here.
Mortgages are seldom used in this state and many lawyers are unaware that in a redemption by a junior encumbrancer from a mortgage or execution sale, that there is no
authority for a Sheriff's deed. The certificate of purchase
becomes void and the junior lienor must commence a new
action on his own lien as well as the one from which he has
redeemed.
There is no reason why two different statutes concerning
redemption should prevail in Colorado. One law should be
applicable to all such redemptions.
In a recent case the Supreme Court held that a leasehold
was real estate and that there was a period of redemption from
the foreclosure of a mortgage or lien against the same. Theretofore the estate of a lessee under a lease for a few years, in
this state, was handled and dealt with by business men, as personalty. Such security is of little value when the tenant can
remain in possession of the leased premises for nine months
after the sale.
The new proposed law is copied from the "Uniform
Mortgage Act" of the American Bar Association, with such
changes as are necessary to suit the different situations in this
state.
The six month period of redemption of the owner has not
been disturbed. A person liable on a deficiency in the foreclosure of any lien also may protect himself by redeeming
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within the first six months, but no other person has the right
to redeem during this period. Unless the original grantors
or other intermediate grantees be liable on a deficiency, there
is no reason to permit them any right of redemption. They
have parted with their interest and are not in any way concerned. However, to prevent any hardship or inequitable
injury, there is a provision which will be discussed later.
If the person liable for a deficiency redeems, either the
owner or other person redeeming from him must pay, not the
price for which the property was sold, but the actual amount
of the lien, plus the costs, expenses, etc.
The different lienors (holders of trust deeds, mortgages
or other liens) are granted definite successive preferences during fixed periods after the six months' period above mentioned.
The spaces of time are the same as provided in the "Uniform
Act". (It may be advisable to enlarge the periods.) The
senior lienor has ten days to redeem and each subsequent lienor has a successive period of five days. The periods are fixed
and if any lienor does not redeem within the period provided,
his lien is eliminated. Each succeeding lien holder redeems
by paying the amount paid in the previous redemption, plus
the amount of the lien held by the party last redeeming.
There is a positive method of determining the priority of
the liens. Every holder of a lien must, before the expiration
of the sixth month period, file a statement with the public trustee, sheriff or other official, declaring his intention to redeem.
At the end of the six months it is a simple matter to determine
how many of the lien holders have elected to redeem, and
when the final period has expired granted to all of the lien
holders combined, the deed will issue.
No lienor has a right to redeem unless he has filed such
declaration, and unless his lien has been recorded at least thirty
days prior to the expiration of the six month period. In the
"Uniform Mortgage Act" this later provision was not as
liberal. There the lien must have been of record at the time
of the sale or no right of redemption is granted. The committee who discussed the Bill believed that such provision was
unfair and that thirty days before the six months would be
ample time for all of the parties to be apprised of their various rights. There must be some limitation as to the record-
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ing of the lien so that the sheriff or other official may determine before the end of the six months who has a right to redeem.
The Bill specifically provides that the holder of a lease
is considered a lienor and may redeem, but if some subsequent
lienor redeems from such lessee the party redeeming takes the
same subject to the lease.
If the estate foreclosed be a leasehold expiring or terminating within ten years or less from the date of the sale, there
is no period of redemption.
There is a provision for the benefit of such parties who
may have some interest or right not provided for in the Bill,
and who should be equitably entitled to redeem. Upon the
proper application to the Court within the six month period,
the Court may allow such party to redeem, subject to proper
conditions.
The Bill further attempts to define and clear up the uncertainty now existing in regard to Receiverships. A Receiver
may be appointed either before or after the sale upon proper
showing. If it appears that the security is clearly inadequate
or that the premises are in danger of being materially injured,
or reduced in value by removal, destruction, deterioration, accumulation of prior liens or the security otherwise rendered
inadequate, the applicant is entitled to such appointment before sale. After the sale, the owner is required to keep the
premises in repair, to use reasonable diligence to continue to
keep the premises yielding an adequate income, and he must
pay the current taxes before penalty accrues and he must pay
the interest on the prior incumbrances and keep the premises
insured. Failure to do any of these things constitutes waste
and a Receiver may be appointed.
The group who have worked in the preparation of this
measure do not believe the contemplated law to be perfect.
They are confident that it would be a vast improvement. However, experience teaches more than theory and from the experiences of the lawyers may be gathered additional ideas
which would enable us to provide against other imperfections.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN
COLORADO
By Allen Moore of the Denver Bar
OLORADO blazed no new trail when in 1923 the General Assembly adopted "An Act concerning Declaratory
Judgments and Decrees and to make Uniform the Law
Relating Thereto," (S. L. 1923, Ch. 98), otherwise known as
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Declaratory relief
was known to the Roman law and throughout Europe where
the Civil Law prevails, it has always been in use as a most
natural part of the procedure. Scotland has used declaratory
judgments for three hundred years; while in England their
use began with the acts of 1852 and 1858 advocated by Lord
Brougham and were fully authorized by the Supreme Court
of Judicature Act of 1873. It is strange indeed, that the demand for this kind of relief here did not come sooner and one
is startled to learn that the first discussion of declaratory judgments in this country appeared in the Yale Law Journal in
1918 in two articles written by Professor Edwin M. Borchard,
of Yale (28 Yale L. Jour. 1, 105). These articles were farreaching in their effect and soon the American Bar Association and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws gave the
movement for this reform their support.
The late T. J. O'Donnell of the Denver Bar was largely
instrumental in furthering the movement for the Uniform
Act. As early as 1920 he and Charles Evans Hughes persuaded the American Bar Association to urge the passage of a
Federal Act. Congress has had under consideration for a
number of years a Federal Declaratory Judgments bill but
thus far it has failed to pass.
In 1922 the Commissioners adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Its adoption by the States has made
rapid progress. Twelve States; Arizona (1927), Colorado
(1923), Indiana (1927), New Jersey (1924), North Dakota
(1923), Oregon (1927), Pennsylvania (1923), South Dakota
(1925), Tennessee (1923), Utah (1925), Wisconsin (1927),
and Wyoming (1923) have adopted the Act. In addition to
these, eleven other states, making a total of twenty-three, have
declaratory judgment acts or have civil practice acts which
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provide for declaratory relief. These states are Rhode Island
(1876 and 1923), Connecticut (1883 and 1918), Florida
(1919), Michigan (1919), New York (1922), Virginia
(1922), South Carolina (1922), California (1923), Hawaii
(1920), Kansas (1921), and Kentucky (1922). Nearly three
hundred cases were reported involving declaratory judgments
in this country from 1919 to 1928. Declaratory Judgment
Acts are also in effect in Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
India and Ceylon.
Borchard is the authority for a statement that the procedure for a declaratory judgment has become so important
in England that approximately 60 per cent of the equity cases
heard for decades have been brought under that procedure.
A study made by him reveals the interesting fact that from
1918 to 1928 the percentage of declaratory judgments in the
English Chancery reports varied from a low of 51.4 in 1922
to a high of 68.8 in 1923. This, of course, takes no account
of the great number of cases decided in the lower courts and
not appealed. It may fairly be assumed that the lower court
decisions were more numerous in proportion because it is
reasonable to suppose that declaratory actions are less likely
to be appealed than cases where coercive judgments are rendered.
In contrast to this situation the three hundred cases appealed in this country would seem to indicate either that the
bar is not informed of the advantages of this new procedure
or that the courts are unfavorable to declaratory judgments.
A study of the decisions indicates no positive unfavorable attitude but here and there, particularly in the United States
Supreme Court, there appears to be some confusion as to the
scope of this procedure.
The Colorado Supreme Court has considered only five
cases in which declaratory judgments were involved since the
passage of the Uniform Act. Before discussing these cases in
detail it will be well to consider the characteristics of declaratory judgments, the scope of the statutes, their constitutionality
and some of the general problems involved.
Since most men are honest,* law suits arise usually from
*The editors of Dicta wish to call the attention of the reader to the fact that
they assume no responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles.
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an honest difference in opinion as to the rights of the party.
If the parties could find out their rights before acting, their
action would conform most frequently to their rights. If
counsel had means of knowing with reasonable certainty the
rights of their clients, their clients would be saved loss by acting within their rights. However, it is an accepted principle
of the common law that a right of action is limited to cases
of an actual or threatened violation of a right in which coercive or corrective relief may be granted and this rule has
been universally enforced in the United States. The courts
have "refused to allow parties to appear in court except under
conditions which permit a display of force by the judicial arm
of the State." Courts are created to redress private wrongs
and punish the commission of crimes and misdemeanors, and
do not sit in an advisory capacity to inform the people of their
particular rights before injury is inflicted.
The declaratory judgment on the other hand, enables the
court to render final judgment between litigants, before breach
or violence has occurred, without attaching to that judgment
a coercive decree for damages or injunction. The judgment
entered differs in no essential respect from any other judgment
between opposing parties except for the coercive feature. It
declares the rights of the parties after a formal complaint or
petition is filed, as in any other suit, without necessarily invoking execution.
Parties may have a controversy as to their legal rights
under contracts, or otherwise, and would much prefer to have
these rights declared thereunder by a court rather than to
await a breach and the seeking of coercive relief. To sue is
to fight, and fights make endless feuds, and bitter antagonisms
and deep scars are left. A declaration by the court as to the
construction of the contract or as to the relative rights of the
parties would prevent most of these unpleasant features of
litigation. Neither party to a controversy need become an
aggressor. In appearance at least every case by this means
becomes a friendly suit.
In most of the European countries, under codes of law,
relief has been divided into two recognized categories, (a)
Definitive or Declaratory, (b) Remedial or Corrective. In
England and in this country before the adoption of declara-
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tory judgments, only the last kind of relief was recognized. In
28 Yale Law Journal, 1-125, Professor Borchard explained
declaratory judgments as follows:
"The purpose is to afford security and relief against uncertainty and
doubt. It does not necessarily pre-suppose culpable conduct on the part of the
defendant, but it enables any party, whose rights, privileges, powers, or immunities-whether evidenced by written instrument or not-have been disputed, in danger thrust, or placed in uncertainty, by another person, to invoke
the aid of a-court to obtain an authority, determination or declaration of his
rights or other legal relations."

Eqpuity has taken account for centuries of this necessary
function of courts in suits to quiet or establish title or remove
a cloud, and to construe trusts and wills.
In proof of the fact that an action resulting in a declaratory judgment is well known to our law, though not so-called,
the following series of actions or proceedings which result
merely in a judgment finally determining the rights of the
parties without requiring the losing party to do anything,
have been listed: bills for the construction of written instruments, mainly wills; for the determination of title to real
estate; actions to remove a cloud from a title; to impress a
trust; declaring instruments or transactions, such as marriage,
invalid, or valid; proving the tenor of lost instruments; the
validity of bond issues; decrees of divorce; adoptions; changing names; registering land titles; legitimacy or illegitimacy;
title to office; bills quia timet; judgments establishing drains,
irrigation rights, line fences, boundary lines, highways, improvements; judgments in escheat; appointing guardians, trustees, receivers, executors, admitting wills to probate; establishing heirship; the action of a trustee for instructions and
many other actions and proceedings.
Declaratory judgment acts recognize all of them and
many other human relationships calling for declaratory relief
and give the advantage of a simple, speedy remedy while the
contractual and other relations during and after the proceeding are not disturbed by a breach.
The nature and range of the questions that have been the
subjects of declarations by the courts in England, in the Colonies and in the States that have adopted the action for declaratory judgments are indicated by the following enumerations:
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(1) Matters relating to the management and distribution
of estates and trials; (2) the construction and validity of instruments such as wills, contracts, leases, insurance, policies,
bills of sale, mortgages and deeds of trust, and assignments;
(3) the construction and validity of statutes; (4) title to real
and personal property; (5) rights of life tenants; (6) relations between husband and wife; (7) legitimacy of persons;
(8) relations between employer and employee; (9) private
associations and corporations; (10) public authorities; (11)
easements; (12) taxation.
The constitutionality of declaratory judgment ,acts has
been upheld in at least eight States:
Kansas (State vs. Grove, 1921, 109 Kan. 619; 201 Pac.
82); California (Blakeslee v. Wilson, 1923, 190 Calif. 479;
213 Pac. 495); Tennessee, (Miller v. Miller, 1924, 149 Tenn.
463; 261 S. W. 465); Pennsylvania, (In re Kariher's petition
No. 1, 1925, 284 Pa. 455; 131 Atl. 265); Virginia (Patterson
Exec. v. Patterson,1926, 144 Va. 113; 131 S. E. 217) ; New
York (Board of Education of Rochester v. Van Zandt, 1923,
195 N. Y. S.297; 235 N. Y. 644); Connecticut (Braman v.
Babcock, 1923, 98 Conn. 549; 120 Atl. 150); New Jersey
(McCrory Stores Corp. v. Braunstein Inc., 1926, 102 N. J.
590; 134 Atl. 752).
Colorado has not passed on the constitutionality of its act
nor has the United States passed on the constitutionality of any
of the state acts. If and when the Federal Act is passed, we
may expect an early decision by the Supreme Court. There
have been three cases before it within the past year or so in
which while the decisions were doubtless correct, what was
said about declaratory judgments was in all three unnecessary
to the decision. The Supreme Court has apparently confused
the constitutional jurisdiction of the federal courts and the
procedural rule-making power of Congress. See American
Bar Association Journal, December, 1928, for a most able article by Edwin M. Borchard, "The Supreme Court and the
Declaratory Judgment', in which these three cases are
thoroughly discussed: Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis
(1927), 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282; Liberty Warehouse
Co. v. Barley Tobacco ®rowers'Assn. (1928), 276 U. S. 71,
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48 Sup. Ct. 291; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assn.
(1928), 48 Sup. Ct. 507.
The Michigan Act of 1919 was the first to undergo the
test of its constitutionality. In Anway v. Grand Rapids
Railway Co., et al. (1920), 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350,
the act was held unconstitutional. This decision has been
very generally criticised. The constitutionality of the Kansas act was the next one tested and it was upheld.
The usual contention urged against the constitutionality
of declaratory judgments acts has been that no problem for
the intervention by judicial functions is present unless an
actual wrong has been done, or is immediately threatened.
This contention is unsound. Some of the broad principles
relating to declaratory judgments may be indicated briefly
as follows:
1. In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for
a declaratory right or a declaratory order or judgment, it is
not necessary that a "cause of action" in the sense of facts
entitling him to consequential relief be present.
2. Jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment is discretionary and should be exercised with great care and with
due regard to all the circumstances of the case.
3. A bona fide controversy as to which judgment will
be res judicata is necessary.
4. When future events are involved the courts should
not assume jurisdiction, unless a present right depends upon
the decision, or there are other special circumstances.
5. A declaration of rights will not be made in a matter
where the interest of the plaintiff is merely contingent upon
the happening of some event in the future.
6. Where there are disputed questions of fact which
may be the subject of judicial investigation in a regular action, the court may. refuse a declaratory judgment.
7. A declaration can not be given as to a claim which
it is feared defendant may assert.
8. In the absence of very special circumstances the
court should not make a declaration of right as to matters
over which jurisdiction is vested in another court.
A consideration of the Colorado declaratory judgments
act (S. L. 1923, Ch. 98), which is the same as the Uniform
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Act, reveals that Courts of Record are given the power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or
proceeding is open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration
may be either affirmative or negative, and it has the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree.
The Act provides that any person interested under a
deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined its construction or validity and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder. A contract may be construed either before or
after breach. Interested persons of defined classes may have
rights declared to determine any class of creditors, devisees,
legatees, heirs, etc., or to direct action or non-action of executors, etc., or to determine questions in administration of
estates or trusts. The court may refuse to declare rights
where the declaration would not end the controversy. All
declarations are subject to review. Further relief may be
granted upon application of notice. Issues of fact may be
tried and determined as in other actions. The Court makes
such award of costs as are equitable and just.
All interested persons should be joined and the rights
of those not joined are not prejudiced. Municipalities are
made parties where municipal ordinances or franchises are
involved, and if their constitutionality is involved, the Attorney-General is served with a copy of the proceeding and
may be heard.
The Act is declared to be remedial and that its purpose
is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty with respect
to rights, status and other legal relations and is to be liberally construed.
As stated above the Colorado Supreme Court has had
before it only five cases involving either directly or indirectly the construction of the Declaratory Judgments Act.
This indicates that Colorado attorneys are availing themselves of the new procedure very slowly, possibly due to
unfamiliarity with the scope of the Act, but certainly not
because of any unfavorable decision of the Court.
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The first case reaching the Supreme Court was Colorado and Utah Coal Co. v. Walter, 75 Colo. 489, 226 Pac.
864, decided June 2, 1924. The plaintiff, Walter, prayed
judgment declaring the respective rights of the parties in
certain waters. After defendants' demurrer was overruled
judgment on the pleadings was entered for plaintiff and the
judgment was affirmed. The Court held, over defendants'
objection, that the controversy was between the plaintiff and
defendants and that a judgment therein would terminate it,
hence, the Act was applicable. At page 491, the Court said:
"Section 12 of the Act asserts that its purpose is 'to settle and to afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respects to rights, status and other
legal relations,' etc. In the instant case it appears that such uncertainty exists.
* * * If these facts do not furnish a proper basis for an action under the
Declaratory Judgments Statute, it is difficult to conceive of any good purpose
to which that legislation can be put."

Mulcahy v. Johnson, et al, 80 Colo. 499, 252 Pac. 816,
decided June 24, 1927, was the next case concerning the act
to be decided by our State Supreme Court and probably the
most important. This was an action for an accounting, and
construction of a will. In one clause of the decree, the Court
declared that the general taxes on vacant, unimproved and unproductive real estate are payable out of the general income
and also that local improvement taxes assessed against unimproved and unproductive real estate are payable out of general income, while those against improved and productive real
estate likely to out last the life estate should be pro-raied. 'The
Court considered these declarations and held that the decisions
were not uniform with respect to the matters in question, that
it was not safe or good practice for a Court of equity by general directions or instructions in advance to designate generally in what cases taxes and assessments should be paid or apportioned but the safer rule was to wait until the concrete
question arose and became important, and decision thereon
became necessary, in which case the Court would have power
to give such instructions. The Court then said:
"We, therefore, say that the Court erred in issuing general abstract
instructions, as to these controverted questions in advance of any necessity
therefor. Our conclusion that it was premature for the district court to issue
instructions in this proceeding as to matters that might never arise in the
administration of the trust is not at all affected by, or inconsistent with, the
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provisions of our Declaratory Judgment Act, Session Laws 1923, p. 268. * * *
We think our district courts, being constitutional courts of original jurisdiction of 'All causes both at law and in equity', had as full and complete jurisdiction and power before, as after, the passage of this Act to construe wills and
trusts and to control executors and trustees in the administration of estates.
It will be observed that the act itself authorizes the determination only of
questions 'arising' in the administration of an estate or trust. In this opinion
we have at the request of the parties determined all questions that have properly
arisen, but we decline to determine those which have not yet arisen and which
may never arise during the administration of the trust. Neither under the
equity practice nor under this Act are the Courts required to give general
advice and instructions upon matters which have not arisen at the time their
jurisdiction is invoked. * * * The Court itself must determine for itself the
propriety of such action, and should refuse to answer speculative inquiries."

While this decision may appear to limit the scope of the
Declaratory Judgments Act in this State with respect to wills,
estates and trusts, the holdings of the Court with respect to the
general rules of interpretation in the use of the act are sound.
Stratton v. Beaver Farmers' Canal and Ditch Co., 82
Colo. 118, 257 Pac. 1077, decided June 13, 1927, was an action
concerning water rights and the prayer was for a declaratory
judgment under the Act. It was there held that the facts
stated in the complaint concerning interference with plaintiff's water rights were sufficient to entitle him to some kind
of relief against defendant but that it would not determine
the merits of the case until the parties had an opportunity to
make an issue of fact. The judgment of dismissal was reversed
with directions to overrule the demurrer and proceed with
the case.
In Rice, et al. v. FranklinLoan and Finance Co., 82 Colo.
163, 258 Pac. 223, decided April 11, 1927, the plaintiffs in
error brought an action under the Act to declare void a note
and chattel mortgage which they gave the Franklin Company,
on the ground that the note was usurious under the Money
Lenders' Act. It was held that the non-suit below was improperly granted where the evidence indicated that the loan
was made at a rate greatly in excess of the 12 per cent. permitted by statute. The contention that the Money Lenders'
Act is unconstitutional was overruled. This case is a beautiful illustration of the use of the Act in the construction of a
statute and a determination of its constitutionality.
The most interesting decision respecting declaratory judg-
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ments in this State was rendered in Gabriel v. Board of Regents of the University of Colorado, 83 Colo. 582, 267 Pac.
417, decided April 30, 1928. The suit was brought under our
Declaratory Judgments Act, to determine the validity of a
contract. Clifford W. Mills entered into a contract with the
Regents to raise funds for and to erect and furnish dormitories
for women upon the campus of the University. Subsequently
plaintiff was elected a member of the Board of Regents and he
assigned the contract to Gabriel. The complaint alleged "that
there is a question of the validity of said contract in that: It
may be contended that the University has no authority to
lease its property"; that the "contract may be in violation of
Sections 1, 3 and 5, Article 11, of the Constitution of the State
of Colorado"; that "The Board of Regents of the University
of Colorado may not have authority to execute this contract";
and plaintiff prayed that the Court "Determine the validity of
the contract". The court noted that the action was filed only
three days after the date of the contract.
The Attorney-General contended that the complaint
stated no cause of action under our Declaratory Judgments
Act.
The decision of the case turned upon the meaning of the
word "arising" in section 2 of the Act, (S. L. 1923, Ch. 98)
which provides that: "Any person interested under a * * *
written contract * * * may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument * *
In this connection the Court said:
"The Attorney-General says the complaint is insufficient because
the state can not be compelled to carry out a building contract, because the
Board of Regents can not encumber the State's property, and because the
contract is void for uncertainty. But if these are questions 'arising' under
the contract their adjudication is the very purpose of the act. The real question, and the only one considered by the learned trial judge, is, 'Have such
questions 'arisen?' The complaint does not say so. This act was not intended
to repeal the statute prohibiting judges from giving legal advice, nor to
impose the duties of the profession upon the courts, nor to provide advance
judgments as the basis of commercial enterprises, nor to settle mere academical
questions. All these things are, however, accomplished by the statute, if this
complaint is good."

The court then considered the allegations of the complaint set forth above and stated:
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"It is perfectly evident that this is no plea that a question has 'arisen'
under this contract. At most it is the expression of a fear that one may arise."

After stating that the trial judge had said that the declaratory judgments act was the father of this contract and
that the contract was made for the purpose of invoking the
jurisdiction of the court, Mr. Justice Burke, who delivered
the opinion of the court, concluded by saying:
"We can not here decide any other of the various questions raised, however desirable it might be to have them settled, unless we are now willing to answer questions 'which have not yet arisen and which may never arise' and reply
to mere 'speculative inquiries.' We can not thus permit the courts to be
converted into legal aid bureaus."

It is reasonable to assume that the Court would have construed the validity of the contract had the questions actually
"arisen" and the allegations of the complaint been properly
framed.
The value of declaratory judgments is evidenced by the
fact of their widespread use elsewhere. It remains for the
Bar of Colorado to become better informed regarding their
use and then to apply this knowledge of one of the greatest
evolutions in remedial rights and procedural reform.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDiTORS NoTE.--It is intended in each issue of the DICrA to print brief abstracts
of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such action being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)

APPEAL AND ERROR-DIVORCE.--No. 12,180.-Taylor vs. Tay-

lor.-DecidedDecember 24, 1928.
Facts.-Defendant in error won a divorce in the lower
Court, and plaintiff in error seeks to have this decision reviewed, but defendant in error moved to dismiss the writ because the notice in such cases required by Section 5605 C.L.
1921, was filed prior to the final decree and not within five
days after the decree.
Held.-It is jurisdictional that the notice be filed as required by statute. This has not been done here and the Supreme Court cannot review the case.
Writ of Error Dismissed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE-TAKING POSSESSION -

AFFIDAVIT OF

TRADE NAME.-No. 12,198.-Rocky Mountain Seed Company vs. McArthur.-Decided November 26, 1928.
Facts.-McArthur held a mortgage, recorded in Weld
County, on an automobile, of which the maturity was extended to July 1, 1927. On Dec. 5, 1927, the Seed Company's execution was levied.on the car in Adams County, and the constable took it into possession, and thereafter, on January 7,
1928, sold it under execution. In February, 1928, McArthur
made formal demand for the car, and thereafter started this
replevin action under his trade name; he had not filed the
affidavit required by Sec. 2457, C.L. 1921.
Held.-When the constable first took the car, McArthur
became entitled to possession without making any demand.
When the mortgage was made the car was in Weld County,
and constituted constructive notice to the Seed Company.
Non-compliance by McArthur with the trade name statute
was not pleaded by the Seed Company, and the point could
not be raised otherwise.
Judgment Affirmed.
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DECREE OF ADOPTION-PROVISION AGAINST DISINHERITANCE
-JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURT.-No. 12 ,12 4 .- In the
Matter of Purported Will of Schmidt.-Decided December 3, 1928.
Facts.-In 1908 the deceased adopted Dillingham by. decree of the Denver County Court, which stated that deceased
promised not to disinherit Dillingham. This was one of the
conditions of the decree of adoption, and thereafter the adoptive father died, leaving a will which attempted to-leave all
of his property to Schmidt, Defendant in Error. Dillingham
is the sole heir at law, and contends that she is entitled to the
entire estate.
Held.-Dillingham is entitled to all the property left by
deceased; the agreement not to disinherit, as set forth in the
decree of the County Court, is valid; and Dillingham's filial
obligations to deceased, her natural parents' relinquishment
of their rights, and the change in her circumstances constituted sufficient consideration. The promise not to disinherit was
a finding of fact which the County Court had jurisdiction to
make. Furthermore, Schmidt is not in a position to contest
the validity of the decree, because it is not subject to collateral
attack. Dillingham, however, has the right to contest the will
by caveat.
Judgment Reversed.
EMINENT DOMAIN-JOINT ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.No.
11,888.-Town of Palisade vs. Orchard Mesa Irrigation
District.-DecidedDecember 24, 1928.
Facts.- Defendant brought this action to condemn a
right-of-way through the baseball park owned by the Town,
and through a farm owned by Yager. Negotiations for purchase of the tract needed by the District failed and an ex parte
order was entered giving it possession. The Town and Yager
joined in this writ of error.
Held.-The assignments of error alleged, particularly
the one relating to the right of the District to take land of a
municipal corporation, are not common to all the plaintiffs
in error and therefore cannot be considered as to any of them.
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The entering of the order of possession ex parte does not contravene the Constitution of the United States.
Judgment Afflrmed.
EQUITY-RESULTING TRUST -

ILLEGAL AGREEMENT. -

No.

12,018.-Genth vs. Gardner.-DecidedDecember 17, 1928.
Facts.-Gardnerbrought this suit against Genth to enforce specific performance of an agreement under which
Genth was to acquire a homestead to certain lands in her own
name, but for the joint use of herself and Gardner. Genth
acquired the title, using some of Gardner's money for the purpose, but refused to convey any interest to him.
Held.-The Homestead Act (U.S.C.A. Title 43, Section
162) provides that an applicant for a homestead shall make an
affidavit that he is taking title to the land for himself and not
for any other person. The agreemeit alleged by Gardner
contravenes this statute. The doctrine of resulting trusts does
not apply and equity will not assist either party.
Judgment Reversed.
FRATERNAL ORDERS-SIMILARITY OF NAMES--I NJ UNCTION.

-No. 11,87.-Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand
Lodge, Free and Accepted Masons of Colorado and Jurisdiction vs. Most Worshipful Hiram Grand Lodge, Free
and Accepted Ancient York Masons of Colorado and Jurisdiction, National Compact Prince Hall Origin.-Decided
December 10, 1928.
Facts.-Plaintiffin error, plaintiff below, filed its articles
of incorporation July 14, 1923; defendant in error filed its
articles January 26, 1926. Both parties have functioned as
negro lodges. Plaintiff claims (1) That defendant is not entitled to the use of the name adopted because of its similarity
to that of plaintiff; and (2) That defendant is not entitled to
use Masonic emblems or insignia.
Held.- (I) Plaintiff has the superior right to its name
and may exclude others from using the same or similar names.
Defendant's name infringes on plaintiff's rights and plaintiff
is entitled to an injunction. (2) Plaintiff also has priority in
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the use of the insignia and emblems in dispute and has the
right to exclude defendant from them.
Judgment Reversed.
GASOLINE TAX-GENERAL TAXES--PRIORITY.-No. 12,059.-

State of Colorado vs. City of Denver.-Decided December 24, 1928.
Facts.-The State recovered judgment against the Shield
Oil Company for $2952.00, and receiver was appointed and
the Company's assets impounded and sold for $1923.00. The
City claimed a lien of $426.00 for general personal property
taxes and asserts that they are a lien prior to the gasoline tax.
Held.-The gasoline tax takes priority because S. L. 1923
Chapter 153, makes this tax a first and prior lien, while the
general tax is by Section 7375 C.L. 1921, only a perpetual lien.
Judgment Reversed.
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICTS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.-No.

12,21.-IHotchkiss vs. Montrose County High School District.-Decided December 24, 1928.
Facts.-Hotchkiss, a resident of the Montrose County
High School District, brought this action to recover $7.35
paid as tuition to the Ouray County High School, where she
attended as a pupil under S.L. 1927, chapter 156. This statute
provides that when the high school of a district is inaccessible
to a resident of the district, such resident may attend another
high school and recover a sum not greater than the tuition
paid to the District containing the school attended. The defendant in error has attacked the validity of the statute.
Held.-The statute is void because it contravenes Section
2 of Article 9 of the Colorado Constitution which provides
that school districts of convenient size shall be organized and
that the directors shall have control of instruction in the public schools in their respective districts.
Judgment Affirmed.
12,209.Roofing Company vs. Fisher.-DecidedNov. 26, 1928.
Facts.-Fisher employed Soderberg to repair a building.

MECHANIC'S LIEN-- COMPLETION OF WORK.-No.
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Soderberg employed the Roofing Company to repair the roof.
The contract between Fisher and Soderberg was not filed for
record, as required by Secs. 6444 and 6450 C.L. 1921, so the
Company's status is that of principal contractor. Its lien statement was filed August 10, 1927. The strips of roofing were
laid during April and May, 1927. Then the workmen were
taken off the job and returned July 5, 1927, to "mop the seams",
which had not been done before.
Held.-There was evidence that "mopping the seams"
was part of the original job, and there was nothing to contradict this. Therefore, the trial court's finding of facts was
erroneous. The work was not completed until July 5, and the
lien statement was filed in time.
Judgment Reversed.
MISREPRESENTATION-EXCHANGE OF PROPERTY.-No.

11,978.

-Cahill vs. Readon.-Decided December 3, 1928.
Facts.-Cahill owned a house in Denver, in which she
lived and which brought her $90.00 a month income in cash.
Readon owned a building in Lusk, Wyoming, which she represented to have a rental value of $100.00 a month. It was
vacant at the time, but Readon told Cahill that she had several prospective tenants and named two of them. This statement was false, but Cahill was ignorant of this fact and traded
her Denver house for the Lusk property. Thereafter it was
found that the Lusk property could not be rented for any price
at all, and Cahill started suit to cancel the exchange.
Held.-It is immaterial whether Readon misrepresented
the sale value of the property in Lusk. Under the facts in this
case, the misrepresentation as to rental value is sufficient to set
aside the exchange.
Judgment Reversed.
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NOTICE
This being the season of battles with income tax reports,
Dicta believes it may be of interest to members of this Association to learn that we have been advised by the office of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue that no deduction can be
made for contributions to the Association such as those made
in connection with the Judicial Salaries Amendment, passed
last November.
The Association is a business league under Section 103 (7)
of the Revenue Act of 1928 and Section 231 (7) of the prior
Acts. Contributions to such are not deductable in the manner
and to the extent provided in Section 23(n) of the Revenue
Act of 1928 and similar provisions of prior Acts, and the ruling published as I.T. 1882, C.B. 11-2, page 201, cited as a
precedent for the conclusion that such contributions are deductable has been revoked.
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